Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Scott H. Phillips v. Kathryn A. Phillips : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Neeley; Campbell & Neeley; attorney for appellant.
Jane A. Marquardt, Martin W. Custen; Marquardt, Hasenyager & Custen; attorney for respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Phillips v. Phillips, No. 890304.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2649

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

C OURX

yT/^

46.9

T/JWTHE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

SCOTT H. PHILLIPS,
Case No.

Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.

Priority No. 13

KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS
De fend ant/Appellant

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal from the Utah Court of Appeals
(Case No. 870579-CA)

Jane A. Marquardt
Martin W. Custen
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorney for Scott H. Phillips
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202
Ogden, Utah 84401
Robert L. Neeley
CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorney for Kathryn A. Phillips
2485 Grant Avenue #200
Ogden, Utah 84401

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SCOTT H. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff/Respondent

Case No.

vs.
Priority No. 13

KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS
Defendant/Appellant

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal from the Utah Court of Appeals
(Case No. 870579-CA)

Jane A. Marquardt
Martin W. Custen
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorney for Scott H. Phillips
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202
dgden, Utah 84401
Robert L. Neeley
CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorney for Kathryn A. Phillips
2485 Grant Avenue #200
Ogden, Utah 84401

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

2

CONTROLLING STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

1. Nature of the Case
2. Disposition at Trial Court
3. Disposition at Court of Appeals
4. Relevant Facts

2
3
3
3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

7

POINT ONE
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE
FACTS WHEN IT STATED THAT MR. PHILLIPS
PAID THE INSURANCE PREMIUMS ON HIS
BROTHER'S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY.

7

POINT TWO
BECAUSE ALL INSURANCE PREMIUMS WERE PAID
WITH GIFTED FUNDS, THE PROCEEDS OF THE
INVESTMENT REMAIN SEPARATE PROPERTY.

9

POINT THREE
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN DIRECT
CONTRADICTION
TO RULINGS OF THIS COURT
IN REVERSING A PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
THAT WAS NOT UNJUST NOR INEQUITABLE.

17

CONCLUSION

19

APPENDIX
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Court of Appeals Opinion
Court of Appeals Order Denying Petition for Rehearing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decree of Divorce
Joinder of Spouse
Summary of Trial Transcript References: Insurance
Premiums Paid From Gifted Funds.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Bailey v. Bailey
295 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. 1982)

16

Giedlnghagen v. Gledinghagen
712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)

12,13

Hill v. Hill
747 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)

13

In re Marriage of Agazim
498 N.E.2d 742 (111. App. 1986)
In re Marriage of Pitluck
616 S.W.2d 861 (MO. Ct. App. 1981)
Mortensen v. Mortensen
760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)

12,13,14
15,16
10,11,14,15,16,17,19

Noble v. Noble
761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988)

18

Petersen v. Petersen
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987)

17

Race v. Race
740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987)

18

Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk
325 N.W.2d 832 (Neb. 1982)

16

Wagner v. Wagner
358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987)
Wierman v. Wierman
387 N.W.2d 744 (Wise. 1986)

12,13,15
14,15

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(1)

2,12

Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(5)

2

Utah Code Annotated §78-2-4

2

Rule 43(2)(3)(4), Utah Supreme Court

2,19

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SCOTT H. PHILLIPS,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

vs.

:

KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No.

Priority No. 13

:

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the Court of Appeals correct in finding

that certain property became marital property because it was
purchased during the marriage regardless of the source of
funds used to acquire the asset?
2.

Did the trial court apportion property in a

manifestly unjust or inequitable fashion so as to amount to
a clear abuse of discretion?
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (hereinafter
referred to as "the Opinion") appears under case number
870579-CA

and

was

labeled

"Not

for

Publication."

Opinion is set forth in the Appendix to this brief.
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The

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision on
March

31, 1989.

It then entered

an Order Denying Mr.

Phillips' Petition for Rehearing on June 16, 1989. The Utah
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to
§78-2-2(5), Utah Code Annotated (as amended 1988), pursuant
to the rule making power conferred upon it by §78-2-4, Utah
Code Annotated (as amended 1986), and through Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, Rule 4 3, subsections (2) , ( 3 ) and (4) .
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated (as amended 1985),
(Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of
parties
and
children
- Court
to
have
continuing
jurisdiction)
30-3-5(1) When a decree of divorce is
rendered, the court may include in it
equitable
orders
relating
to
the
children, property and parties...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature

of

the Case.

This

is

a divorce

proceeding; trial was held before the Honorable David E.
Roth in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County.
The Decree of Divorce was entered on November 18, 1987
(See Appendix C) .

Mrs. Phillips appealed that decision to

the Utah Court of Appeals, which (1) modified the property
division and (2) remanded the case for further findings of
fact concerning the alimony award.

This Petition for Writ

of Certiorari challenges only the property division.
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2.
found

that

totalled

Disposition at Trial Court.
the

assets

$260,000,

were

of

Phillips

the

The trial court

Investments,

separate

property

Phillips and not part of the marital estate
para.11).

which

of

Mr.

(R. p.202,

The court found that the marital estate had

assets totalling $140,876 (R. p.203, para.12) and awarded
Mr.

Phillips assets totalling $70,052 and Mrs. Phillips

assets totaling $70,824.

(Note - although Mr. Phillips

received assets valued at $94,052 and Mrs. Phillips received
assets valued at $46,824, this was equalized by Mr. Phillips
paying to Mrs. Phillips the sum of $24,000 (R. pp.206 & 207,
para.11, 12 & 13).
3.

Disposition at Court of Appeals.

The Court of

Appeals found that the half of Phillips Investments that
Scott Phillips received when his brother died was received
as the result of a Buy-Sell Agreement
brothers.

between the two

The Court said this turned half of Phillips

Investments into property which was acquired as a result of
a purchase during the marriage and was therefore marital,
not separate property.

It awarded Mrs. Phillips 50% of this

half of Phillips Investments, for a total additional property award to her of $70,000 (Opinion, pp.5&6).
5.

Relevant Facts.

In addition to the marital

estate assets of $140,876, there were also approximately
$260,000 worth of assets

in Phillips Investments.
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The

Phillips Investments business entity was created
Phillip's

parents

through

their

operation

of

by Mr.

a funeral

home business in Idaho from 1937 to 1979 (Tr. p.11).

In

19 66, it became known as White Mortuary, Inc., with Mr.
Phillips and his parents being listed as initial incorporators (R. Exhibit #12).

Mr. Phillips and his parents each

received one share of stock in the corporation, but Mr.
Phillips was not involved in the operation of the business
(Tr. p.14).
In the 1970s, Mr. Phillip's parents began a yearly
gift giving program in order to gradually transfer ownership
of the business to their two sons with a minimum of estate
tax consequences (Tr. pp.15, 39). In 1979, the parents sold
the mortuary business to a Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Holman, and
in

1982, the

two

sons

purchased

the balance

of their

parents1 ownership in the business by signing a promissory
note (Tr. p.17, 18). The payments on the promissory note to
Mr. Phillip's parents were made out of the yearly payments
received from Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Holman (Tr. p.18).
In 198 3, the Phillips Investments entity was converted from a corporation to a partnership (Tr. p. 20).

In

that same year, Mr. Phillips and his brother Mark signed a
Buy-Sell Agreement indicating that if either died, the other
would become sole owner of the assets (R. Exhibit #5). At
the same time, the wives of Mr. Phillips and his brother
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signed Joinder of Spouse documents (R. Exhibit #17 and see
Appendix D to this brief), indicating they made no claim to
the assets of Phillips Investments and recognizing it was
the separate property of their husbands.
Phillips Investments then purchased life insurance
policies on both brothers in order to fund the Buy-Sell
Agreement.

The premiums for the insurance policies were

paid from yearly gifts of cash made to the brothers by their
parents (See Appendix E ) .

In 1984, Mr. Phillips1 brother

died and Mr. Phillips became the sole owner of the assets.
In 19 85, Mr. Phillips

created

the Phillips

Investments

Trust and placed into it all of the assets which had been
part of the Phillips Investments business entity (Tr. p.7,
lines 1-5).
Whatever the legal form of the Phillips! family
business over the years, neither Mr. Phillips nor Mrs.
Phillips were actively involved in the operation of the
business.

Mrs. Phillips was never involved in any part of

the business or the management of assets (Tr. p.140, lines
10-19).

Neither party ever added any of their own monies to

the assets of Phillips Investments
p.140, lines 20-23).

(Tr. p.65, lines 2-5;

Mr. Phillips' own involvement was very

minimal and was limited to signing various documents his
family advised him to sign (Tr. p. 14, lines 9-11; p. 16,
lines 4-6; p.17, lines 22-25; p.24, lines 8-22; p.41, lines
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21-25; p.42, line 1; p.64, lines 1-5).

Mr. Phillips1 par-

ents testified that they still kept the books and records
for Phillips Investments

(Tr. p. 23, lines 9 & 10; p. 45,

lines 7-9) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals1
because

Scott

Phillips

decision, in ruling that

acquired

one-half

of

Phillips

Investments through a Buy-Sell Agreement it was a purchase
made during the marriage and therefore a marital asset, is a
dramatic
Court.

departure

from

precedents

established

by

this

The Opinion ignores the fact that the Buy-Sell

Agreement was funded by an insurance policy which was paid
for with gifted funds. The Opinion established a new precedent in Utah that when separate property is used to purchase
a new asset, that new asset is thereby transformed into marital property.

(It is interesting to note that despite this

significant new rule of law, the Court of Appeals designated
the Phillips' Opinion as "Not for Publication.11)

Because

the Court of Appealsf Opinion is in conflict with prior
decisions of this Court, this Court should exercise its
power of review.

If the Court of Appeals is correct in its

ruling that the type of transaction involved in Phillips
transforms separate property to marital property, this is an
important and new question of law which should be settled by
this Court.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS
WHEN IT STATED THAT MR. PHILLIPS PAID THE
INSURANCE PREMIUMS ON HIS BROTHER'S LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY.
The Court of Appeals refers several times in its
Opinion to the "fact" that Mr. Phillips himself furnished
the consideration to pay for the insurance policy on Mark
Phillips1 life.

At the bottom of Page 3, the court states

"...consideration for the insurance policy was paid by Mr.
Phillips himself, not by a donor."

At the top of Page 4 of

the Opinion, the court states that "Mr.

Phillips did not

show it (the interest he acquired from his brother) .. .was
acquired...with gifted or inherited funds."

At the top of

Page 5, the court states "(t)he fact that Mr. Phillips utilized

insurance proceeds

from

a policy

he purchased..."

Again, at the bottom of Page 5, the court states that the
share of Phillips Investments that Mr. Phillips received on
the death of his brother "...was not purchased with funds
that were gifted to him by a donor."
These statements by the Court of Appeals are absolutely incorrect.

Nowhere in the trial of this action did

Mr. Phillips or anyone else testify that he paid for the
insurance premiums out of his own assets.
All references to payment of insurance premiums in
the trial transcript show that Mr. Phillips' parents, Hugh
and Frances Phillips, were making yearly gifts to their two
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sons (Scott and Mark) to allow them to pay the premiums on
the life insurance policies.

A summary of those references

from the trial transcripts is attached as Exhibit E in the
Appendix to this brief.
If the Court of Appeals thought there was any
confusion on the issue of whether or not Scott Phillips paid
any of the insurance premiums from his marital property, it
should have remanded the case to the trial court for further
testimony.

Mr. Phillips' parents could certainly produce

evidence of each of the yearly checks that they gave to
Scott and Mark as gifts in order to pay the insurance
premiums, together with the checks that were then written by
Mark to the insurance company to pay the premiums.

There is

not one reference in the trial transcript to Scott Phillips
ever

having

premiums.

personally

made

any

payments

of

insurance

While the parties' Buy-Sell Agreement, introduced

as Exhibit 5 at the trial, does contain language that sounds
as if Mr. Phillips was personally purchasing the insurance
policies, this is not what in fact happened.

This Court

should look at the manner in which the parties actually conducted their business to determine whether or not an asset
is separate or marital property.

Because Mr. Phillips1 mar-

ital property was in no way involved with the funding of
this Buy-Sell Agreement, the proceeds of the funding should
remain separate property.
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It should also be noted that Mrs. Phillips makes
much of the fact that the parties lived

in a Jackson,

Wyoming home from 1970 to 1979 which was owned by Phillips
Investments.

When Phillips Investments sold the house, it

made a profit of approximately $55,000 (Tr. p.48).
Phillips

argues

that

this

shows

Mrs.

that part

of Phillips

Investments should have been a marital asset.

However, in

making this argument, she ignores the fact that the parties
only had to pay rent of $150 per month for a home which had
a fair rental value of $750 per month at the time they moved
out (Tr. p.131, lines 23-25, p.132, lines 1-14).

The fact

that the parties were able to live for such a long period of
time with a minimal rent payment most certainly allowed them
to build their financial strength, such that they were able
to acquire a marital estate worth some $140,000.

The fact

that Phillips Investments made a profit from the sale of the
home is not cause to bring the proceeds into the marital
estate.
POINT TWO:

BECAUSE ALL INSURANCE PREMIUMS WERE PAID WITH
GIFTED FUNDS, THE PROCEEDS OF THE INVESTMENT
REMAIN SEPARATE PROPERTY.

The Court

of Appeals' Opinion

states

that Mr.

Phillips acquired his brother's Phillips Investments stock
during marriage by purchase and it is therefore marital
property (p.5).

The court also noted, in Footnote 4, that

even if it believed Mr. Phillips had paid the insurance pre-
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miums

with

gifted

funds, he

might

have

recovered

the

premiums, but the proceeds of the insurance policy would
still be deemed marital property.
In ruling that because an asset was acquired during
marriage by purchase, it becomes marital property, the court
greatly deviated

from the principles enunciated

by this

Court for determining whether an asset is separate property
or marital property.

In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d

304 (Utah 1988), the Court stated that trial courts making
equitable property distributions should
...generally award property acquired by
one spouse by gift and inheritance during
the marriage (or property acquired in
exchange
thereof)
to
that
spouse,
together
with
any
appreciation
or
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the
other spouse has by his or her efforts or
expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection
of that
property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it, ... or (2) the property
has been consumed or its identity lost
through co-mingling or exchanges or where
the acquiring spouse has made a gift of
an interest therein to the other spouse.
760 P.2d at 308.
The Phillips1 Opinion dismisses the fact that neither party contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or
protection of the property.

It also dismisses the fact that

the property completely retained its separate identity and
that

it was not

property.

co-mingled

with

the Phillips1

marital

(The few assets obtained from Phillips Investment

money, such as Mr. Phillips1 car and part of the IRAs, were,
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at

the

suggestion

property.

of Mr. Phillips, treated

See Tr. p.67, lines 2-6; Tr. p.68, lines 10-25,

Tr. p.69, lines 1-11.)
factors

as marital

The court dismissed all of these

as insignificant

Phillips

"purchased"

in view of the fact that Mr.

his brother's

interest

in Phillips

Investments during marriage.
Since the Court of Appeals seems to be unconcerned
with the source of funds used by Mr. Phillips to make this
purchase, the logical extension of its ruling is that any
party who sells separate property during marriage thereby
loses the separate status of that asset.

If stocks are sold

to buy bonds, the bonds become marital property.

If real

estate is sold to buy gold coins, the coins become marital
property.

If an insurance policy is sold for its cash sur-

render value, and the money is used to purchase a certificate of deposit, the certificate of deposit becomes marital
property.

This method of analyzing separate property cre-

ates an exception so large that it swallows the principles
set forth in Mortensen.
The Utah Supreme Court in Mortensen commented on
the purpose for its ruling:
These rules will preserve and give effect
to the right that married persons have
always had in this state to separately
own and enjoy property. It also accords
with the normal intent of donors or
deceased persons that their gifts and
inheritances should be kept within their
family and succession should not be
diverted because of divorce. 760 P. 2d at
308 Sc 309.
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Clearly,

Mr.

Phillips1

parents, Hugh

and

Frances, who

engaged in a painstakingly crafted gift giving program over
a period of years (Tr. pp.39 & 40) and who gifted cash to
their sons on a yearly basis in order to purchase the insurance policies used to secure the Buy-Sell Agreement, are
exactly the type of persons to whom this Court referred when
it discussed donors who intended to keep their gifts in the
family.
The Court

of

Appeals

cited

Giedinghagen

v.

Giedinghagen, 712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), In Re
Marriage of Agazim, 498 N.E.2d 742 (111. App. 1986), and
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987), as
cases that support its conclusion that any property acquired
during marriage by purchase or winnings is marital property.
However, careful analysis of these cases show that they are
not good authority for a court applying the Utah equitable
distribution statute (§30-3-5, U.C.A.).
The court referred to Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen,
supra, as authority for a wifefs lottery winnings being marital property.

However, the Missouri court was interpreting

a specific state statute as to whether property acquired
after the filing of the divorce petition, but before the
final divorce, was marital or separate property.

The state

statute, unlike Utah's, said that "all property acquired by
either spouse is presumed to be marital property."
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(712

S.W.2d at 712).
winnings,

won

The court said that the wife's lottery
after

the

filing

of

the

petition

for

dissolution, were marital property under the definition in
the statute. However, the court then said
We do not hold nor intimate that husband
here is entitled to any portion of the
proceeds of the lottery winnings.
The
court is to make a just distribution of
the marital property and in doing so may
take into account the contribution of
each spouse to the acquisition of the
property as well as other considerations.
(712 S.W.2d at 714, emphasis in the
original).
A

later

case

from

that

same

court,

citing

Giedinghagen, noted the importance of looking at the "source
of funds" rule for determining whether property is marital
or separate.

In Hill v. Hill, 747 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. Ct. App.

1988), the court stated that if separate property has been
partly purchased through the use of marital funds, it would
result in a percentage marital interest in a spouse's otherwise separate property.
allocated

proportionately

"Incremental property values are
to either marital

or separate

estates according to the source of funds used to purchase
the property."

747 S.W.2d at 719

In the case of In re Marriage of Agazim, supra, the
Illinois court was, again, interpreting a specific Illinois
statute different from any in Utah.

In that case, the court

ruled that an interest a father gave to his daughter that
included an obligation on the part of the daughter to pay
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annual payments to the father was a purchase and not a gift
for the purposes of property distribution.

However, what

the Utah Court of Appeals fails to note is that upon remand
to the trial court for equitable distribution of assets the
court awarded the entire interest to the wife because all of
the payments made to her father were made with funds generated by the property, which neither spouse had to expend any
effort to realize.
considered.

In other words, the source of funds was

See In re Marriage of Agazim, 530 N.E.2d 110

(111. App. 1988) .
The Court of Appeals also cited the case of Wagner
v. Wagner, supra, as authority for the proposition that a
transaction that was a purchase during marriage made the
asset marital property.

In Wagner, the court found that a

daughter!s signing of promissory notes to her father to
acquire interest in a shopping center was a purchase, not a
gift, even though the father later forgave repayment of the
promissory
children.

notes

as

a

program

of

gift

giving

to

his

The court said that because it was a purchase, it

was marital property.
This

is

different

than

the

result

reached

Wierman v. Wierman, 387 N.W.2d 744 (Wise. 1986).

in

(Wierman

is a case cited by the Utah Supreme Court in its Mortensen
decision as it reviewed case law from other states and, from
that review, enunciated the principle to be followed in
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Utah.

See 760 P.2d at 307.)

In Wierman, the father had

transferred his interest in a real estate venture to his
daughter.

The transfers were made over a period of years

and were structured as part gift and part purchase, with the
purchase price payable in installments.

The father each

year forgave the repayment of the daughter's promissory
notes as a gift. The Wierman court, in direct contradiction
to the Wagner court, found that the wife's interest in this
real estate venture, acquired by her through a gift from her
father, retained its character as separate property, despite
the fact that purchase documents had been signed.

The court

also noted that despite a sale and exchange of assets, the
increase in the value of the separate property was not
attributable to either spouse, but was the result of a
source independent of the marriage.
should remain separate property.

Therefore, the asset

The logic followed by the

Wisconsin court in Wierman is much more in line with the
Utah principles explained in Mortensen for evaluating separate and marital property than the logic followed by the
Virginia court in Wagner.
It is instructive to review three other cases that
were cited in the Mortensen decision by this Court (760 P.2d
at 307) as it reviewed case law from other states as supportive of the principles it established for evaluating separate property.

In the case of In re Marriage of Pitluck,
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616 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), the court found that the
cash value of life insurance policies attributable to premiums paid by the husband fs father could be treated as gifts
from the father to son and were therefore the sonfs separate
property.

The court acknowledged that a percentage of the

value attributable to premiums paid by the son from marital
funds could be considered marital property; however, there
was insufficient evidence in this case on what that amount
would be.

Similarly, in Phillips, the value of the life

insurance policy, which in this case had a death benefit
value rather than a cash surrender value, should be Mr.
Phillips1

separate property.

See also Bailey v. Bailey,

295 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. 1982), (husband's mother had used proceeds of a life insurance policy on the husband's father to
buy a home and gave the home to the husband; the court held
the home was separate property); and Van Newkirk v. Van
Newkirk, 325 N.W.2d 832 (Neb. 1982), (the increase in the
value of an asset, when that increase was not due to the
efforts of either marital partner, should remain separate
property).
In Mortensen, this Court discussed three circumstances where there would be an exception to the rule that
property acquired by gift should remain the separate property of the donee spouse.

On p.307, the Court lists the

following three exceptions:
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1. When the property thus acquired is
consumed, such as when a gift or inheritance of money is used for family
purposes.
2.
When the property completely loses
its identity and is not traceable because
it is co-mingled with other property.
3.
When the acquiring spouse places
title in joint names in such a manner as
to evidence -an intent to make it marital
property.
Clearly, none of these circumstances were present in Mr.
Phillips1 treatment of the assets of Phillips Investments.
The trial court was correct when it examined the contributions that had been made by Mr. and Mrs. Phillips to the
assets of Phillips Investments, and upon determining that
neither party had made any contributions to the assets, that
it should remain the separate property of Mr. Phillips.
POINT

THREE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN DIRECT
CONTRADICTION TO RULINGS OF THIS COURT IN
REVERSING A PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION THAT WAS NOT
UNJUST NOR INEQUITABLE.
The Court of Appeals is not permitted to reverse a

trial court's property distribution unless the apportionment
"works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate
a clear abuse of discretion."
P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987).

Petersen v. Petersen, 737
This Court in the Mortensen

decision reemphasized this fact:
Significantly no case has been found
where this court has reversed a trial
court's disposition of gifts or inherited
property received by one party during the
marriage. In almost every case we have
emphasized the wide discretion trial
courts have in property division.
760
P.2d at 307.
-17-

The trial court in this case was within its discretion in finding that the assets of Phillips Investments were
the separate property of Scott Phillips.

In fact, the trial

court considered Mr. Phillips1 income from the assets when
determining the appropriate amount of child
alimony.

support and

The fact that the Court of Appeals does not agree

with the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion does not give it the right to reverse that decision.
This Court has also noted that sometimes the only
equitable distribution of property involves awarding some of
the gifted or inherited separate property to the non-donee
spouse.

This Court has stated that, "the overarching gen-

eral rule remains the same in any divorce case:

to provide

adequate support for the children of the marriage.11 Race v.
Race, 740 P.2d 253 at 256 (Utah 1987), and, "to divide the
economic assets and income stream of the parties so as to
permit both to maintain themselves after the marriage as
nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage."
1988).

Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 at 1373 (Utah

In the case at hand, very little of the money from

Phillips Investments was used to maintain a certain standard
of living.
Investments1

Those assets which were purchased from Phillips
money and used by the parties were clearly

labeled marital assets and divided as part of the marital
estate.

-18-

CONCLUSION
The Court

of Appeals, in labeling

one-half of

Phillips Investments marital property simply because it was
acquired by "purchase" during the marriage, has issued a
decision which conflicts with the principles set forth by
this Court in Mortensen and its predecessors.

The lower

court has failed to look at the source of funds used to
acquire the asset, and has ignored the fact that neither
spouse contributed any effort or money to the value of the
asset.

Pursuant to Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah

Supreme Court, this Court should grant review by writ of
certiorari.
Furthermore, if there is to be a new rule in Utah
which states that assets acquired by purchase during marriage are to be labeled marital assets, it is a rule which
should be explained and set forth by this Court.

It would

cause a major change in the way attorneys and clients would
evaluate assets, both in terms of divorces and in terms of
estate, gift and tax planning.
review, this Court would

Most likely, after full

conclude that such a dramatic

change in the law would have to come from the legislature,
not the courts.

It certainly is not a change in the law

that should come from an unpublished opinion of a panel of
the Court of Appeals.
of

the

Utah

Supreme

Pursuant to Rule 43(4) of the Rules
Court,

-19-

this

Court

should

grant

certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J7 ^" day of July, 1989.
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Kathryn A. Phillips,
Defendant and Appellant.

Second District, Weber County
The Honorable David E. Roth
Attorneys:

Robert L. Neeley, Ogden, for Appellant
Jane A. Marquardt, Ogden, for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant, Kathryn Phillips, seeks reversal or adjustment
of the property and alimony awarded to her upon divorce. We
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for
further consideration.
The precise property issue we must decide is whether
property acquired during marriage through a buy-sell agreement
of one spouse is the separate property of that spouse or
marital property?
The alimony issue is whether the findings support the
alimony award as to amount and time limit.
PROPERTY:

SEPARATE OR MARITAL?

The parties were married October 6, 1967. At the time of
divorce, each was forty-five years of age and their two sons
were nineteen and sixteen. Mrs. Phillips had one year of
college and one and one-half years of medical technology
training prior to marriage. She was a homemaker during the

twenty-year marriage and was unemployed when divorced. Mr.
Phillips was a career employee with the U.S. Forest Service.
In January 1967, Scott Phillips' parents organized a
business corporation which became known as Phillips Investment
Corporation, Inc. During the 1970*s, his parents gifted to him
and his brother, Mark, 24.5% each of the corporate stock. On
January 1, 1980, the brothers entered into a "Buy-Sell Stock
Agreement.M Therein each agreed to purchase the stock of the
other in the event of death or a lifetime sale. The purchase
price was to be determined on an annual basis by endorsing a
stock value on a schedule. Each agreed to procure, as policy
owner and beneficiary, life insurance on the life of the other
in the amount specified in the schedule. Each was required to
maintain the policy owned, "paying all premiums when due and
delivering proof of such premium payment to the insured." If
the premium was not paid, the other could advance payment and
would be entitled to reimbursement with interest. Their
agreement provided that upon death of a stockholder, "the
surviving stockholder shall purchase all of the decedent's
stock in the corporation." In the event the value of the stock
exceeded the insurance proceeds, the balance of the purchase
price could be paid by delivering a negotiable promissory note
in that amount payable on terms specified. If life insurance
coverage exceeded the stock value, "the excess of each policy
shall be retained by the beneficiary thereof for his own
benefit."
In 1982, the brothers acquired the balance of the corporate
stock from their parents and became equal owners. In 1983, the
brothers converted the corporation into Phillips Investments, a
general partnership. At that time, they requested each of
their wives to sign a document labeled "Joinder of Spouse," and
each wife obliged on May 12, 1983. That document stated that
"the stock of [the corporation] was acquired by her husband
prior to their marriage or by gift during marriage" and is his
sole and separate property and that "all income and gains from
such separate property shall be the sole and separate property
of said husband." (Emphasis added.)
In 1984, Mark Phillips died, and Scott Phillips purchased
his brother's 50% share of Phillips Investments for $218,000
funded by insurance proceeds. Thereafter, Mr. Phillips
transferred the assets into Phillips Investment Trust. At time
of trial, the trust was valued at $260,000. The lower court
entered the following finding of fact:
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Plaintiff is the owner of assets worth
approximately $260,000.00 which are now in
the entity known as Phillips Investment
Trust. These assets were gifted to
plaintiff by his parents over a period of
many years. Neither plaintiff nor
defendant have done any significant work
in the business which made up Phillips
Investments, nor have either of them made
any contributions to the value of the
assets in Phillips Investments. The
assets of Phillips Investments are
Plaintiffs' separate property and
defendant has no claim to this property.
The fact that plaintiff does have the
resources of Phillips Investments
available to him is relevant only to his
ability to pay child support and alimony.
The conclusions of law state: "The assets of Phillips
Investment Trust are plaintiff's sole and separate property and
defendant has no claim thereto." Mrs. Phillips contends that
the one-half ownership of the partnership-trust acquired from
Mark Phillips was not "by means of inheritance or gift but as
the result of a business transaction." Thus, she argues, this
particular 50% ownership share is marital property, not Mr.
Phillips' separate property. Mr. Phillips argues in support of
the above findings. He also argues that, in any event, the
language of the "Joinder of Spouse" document should be
dispositive of any claim that this last-acquired 50% share is
marital property. We do not agree with Mr. Phillips.
Our initial consideration is whether the stock was acquired
during marriage. Virtually all of the stock was acquired
during the twenty-year marriage. The business corporation was
organized the same year the parties were married. The lower
court found that 100% of the assets (stock) was gifted to Mr.
Phillips by his parents. That finding is clearly in error.
The parties agree that 50% was acquired from Mark Phillips, not
from the brothers' parents. Further, Mark's 50% was not
acquired by gift; consideration for the insurance policy was
paid by Mr. Phillips himself, not by a donor. In any event,
Mr. Phillips acquired his brother's 50% during the marriage.
Thus, it was not premarital property.
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Insofar as the stock purchased from his brother is
concerned, Mr, Phillips did not show it was owned by him prior
to marriage, or that he acquired it by gift or inheritance
during the marriage or with gifted or inherited funds. See
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988)• Only his
first 50% interest was obtained from his parents by gift. As
to the gifting of that portion, the finding of the lower court
is affirmed. The joinder document signed by Mrs. Phillips
relates only to that stock acquired by him before marriage or
by gift during marriage. The legality of the document is not
at issue and we need not consider its validity. Moreover, it
only relates to the separately owned stock acquired up to that
time or to income from that stock (interest or dividends) or
gain from that stock (appreciation in value). The remainder of
the stock acquired from his brother by virtue of their buy-sell
agreement was neither income nor gain from his prior holdings.
This is not a case like Preston.1 which involved appreciation
in value of a premarital asset of the husband2 and property
inherited by the wife, nor is it like Burke, which involved
appreciation in value of the wife's inherited property.3
On the other hand, this is a case like Wagner v. Wagner, 4
Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407, 409-11 (1987). There, a father
gave each of his children an option to acquire an interest in a
shopping center. Each of the children exercised the option and
delivered promissory notes to their father in payment of the
purchase price. Later, the father forgave payment of the notes
as gifts to his children. Thereafter, one of his married
daughters became involved in a divorce action. She contended
the entire transaction was a gift and that her shopping center
ownership was her separate property. The husband contended
that, when she acquired the interest, she did so with a loan
from her father. Thus, he argued that the transaction was a
purchase, not a gift, and that the forgiving of the note was
irrelevant. The court agreed that the transaction was a
1.

Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982).

2.

Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987).

3. The trial court and the parties mistakenly characterized
the property issue as appreciation in value after inheritance
or gift. Their concern was whether either party had done work
or made contributions adding value to the stock gifted by Mr.
Phillips• parents.
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purchase on the date it occurred and the character thereof
could not be altered by later action.
Here, the Phillips brothers' stock transaction was pursuant
to an arm's-length buy-sell agreement. The fact that Mr.
Phillips utilized insurance proceeds from a policy he purchased
to fund the full purchase price of his brother's stock did not
change the transaction to one of gift or inheritance. Nor
would the character of the transaction be other than purchase
if funded part by insurance proceeds and part by notes, as
their buy-sell agreement contemplated, or if funded by
borrowing from a third party, or by some other fortuitous
event, such as a lottery. The stock was acquired during
marriage by purchase and is marital property. See In re
Marriage of Aaazim, 147 111. App. 3d 646, 498 N.E.2d 742 (1986)
(transfer of apartment building to wife from wife's father was
sale rather than nonmarital gift, agreement transferring
buildings was contract of sale); Giedinghagen v. Giedinohaaen,
712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (wife's lottery winnings
were marital property, subject to equitable distribution).
In summary, Mr. Phillips did not acquire his brother's
stock prior to marriage. It was not separate as premarital
property. His brother's share was not received by Mr. Phillips
from anyone as an heir or devisee. Thus, it was not separate
as inherited property. The share was not received by Mr.
Phillips from a donor as donee and was not purchased with funds
that were gifted to him by a donor. Thus, it was not separate
as gifted property. Mr. Phillips was a buyer who purchased the
stock from a seller pursuant to a written contract of sale.
Thus, the stock is marital property because acquired by
purchase during marriage. The funding arrangement did not
alter the nature of the property acquired.4
The parties requested, as being equitable, an equal
4. In his brief, Mr. Phillips argues that "the evidence shows
that plaintiff had received these assets through gifts and
inheritance from his family." He did not argue that the
insurance proceeds were his separate property on any
rationale. If he had shown that the insurance premiums were
paid with advances of his separate property, he might have
recovered the amount thus paid, but not the proceeds of the
insurance policy. See, e.g., Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705
(Utah 1982) (husband credited with $9,310.93 advanced on
cabin); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) (wife
reimbursed $3,400 advanced as down payment on family home).
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distribution of their marital property. The lower court
honored their requests concerning the property distributed.
Thus, Mrs. Phillips is entitled to one-fourth of the Phillips
Investment Trust (one-half of 50%) as valued on the date of
divorce, together with a pro rata share of income/loss and
appreciation/depreciation accrued thereon.
We reverse and remand for a property award consistent with
this opinion.
ALIMONY AWARD
Finally, we turn to the alimony award of $1,000 per month
for ten years. Mrs. Phillips1 principal assertion concerning
alimony is that the trial court failed to make findings on two
of the three alimony factors stated in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). We agree with this contention. The
trial court found that Mr. Phillips had ability to provide
support from his income of $5,000 per month. There is no
finding concerning Mrs. Phillips' needs. Her exhibit showed
monthly living expenses of $1,000. He did not challenge that
amount. He claims she only asked for $1,000 alimony, but her
request was made in tandem with a request for $156,584 in
property distribution. She received only $71,000 in property.
The court did make the following finding relating to the factor
of her ability to support herself:
Defendant has received post high school
training and earned a certificate in
medical technology. Defendant has not
used this certificate in many years and
has been employed only in a few minor
jobs; during most of defendant's marriage
to plaintiff, she has been a full time
homemaker and not employed outside the
home. Defendant has basically good
health, is intelligent, and is capable of
employment. Defendant has no current
source of income and is entitled to an
award of alimony.
There is no finding concerning her earning capacity, which
would provide a baseline for modification purposes. See Hialey
v. Hiolev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 & n.l (Utah 1983); Canning v.
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 326-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). We are
unable to review the adequacy of the findings to support the
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conclusion that Mplaintiff should pay to decedent the sum of
$1,000.00 per month,H nor do we see any evidence or finding
supporting or relevant to the conclusion that alimony should
continue for a period of only ten years and not be permanent.
Nothing in the record indicates any particular significance of
that period of time.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for additional findings
concerning: (1) Mrs. Phillips' needs;5 (2) her ability to
provide for herself, including an earning capacity baseline;
(3) elimination of the ten-year cap on alimony; (4) a separate
finding concerning income which will flow to both parties from
the assets awarded them; and (5) an alimony award consistent
with those findings. See Johnson v. Johnson, 103 Utah Adv.
Rep. 22 (Ct. App. March 8, 1989).

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

•o

* D

,4
1>VJ**

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

5. Mrs. Phillips testified that she needed, in addition to her
monthly living expenses, income for employment training and
rehabilitation so she could provide for herself. Apparently,
she expected to provide for her rehabilitation through income
from a larger property award, which she did not receive.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SCOTT H. PHILLIPS,

:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

vs.

:

KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. 98183

:

The above entitled matter came on regularly for
trial on October 23, 1987 before the Honorable David E.
Roth, judge of the above entitled court.

Plaintiff was both

personally present and represented by his attorney Jane A.
Marquardt.

Defendant was present and represented by her

attorney Robert L. Neeley.

Upon hearing sworn testimony

from the parties and witnesses, and after receiving into
evidence various written exhibits, and hearing arguments of
counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, the court
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and defendant maintained a matrimo-
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nial domicile in Weber County, State of Utah, and defendant
was a resident of Weber County for more than three months
immediately preceding the filing of this divorce complaint.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife,

having been married on October 6, 1967 in Alta, Utah.

Both

plaintiff and defendant are presently 45 years of age.
3.

Two children have been born as issue of this

marriage, one of whom is still a minor, to wit:

Christopher

John Phillips, born November 11, 1970.
4.

During the marriage, the parties have experi-

enced various problems and they have now been separated for
approximately one year and both parties are entitled to be
granted a decree of divorce on the basis of irreconcilable
differences.
5.

Plaintiff and defendant agree that defendant

should be awarded custody of the minor child, subject to
plaintiff's reasonable rights of visitation.
6.

Plaintiff is a full time employee of the United

States Forest Service and has received a gross monthly salary of $3,155.00.

He also has the right to receive income

from Phillips Investment Trust.

Over the past five years,

the amount of income available to plaintiff from Phillips
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Investments has averaged $25,000.00 per year and the court
finds that plaintiff will continue to receive approximately
this amount of money from Phillips Investments.

The court

finds that plaintiff's income will continue at close to this
rate despite the fact that the major income of Phillips
Investments, payments from the Hamilton/Holman promissory
note, will cease after 1990.

The court believes that the

assets of the trust are worth approximately $260,000.00 and
will continue to generate at least $21,000.00 per year in
income to plaintiff.
7.

The court believes it is reasonable to set

plaintiff's child support and alimony responsibilities on an
expected total monthly gross income of $5,000.00. This figure includes $3,155.00 per month from plaintiff's employment
with the forest service and $l,750.00-$2,08 3.00 per month
from Phillips Investments.
8.
ing

and

Defendant has received post high school train-

earned

a

certificate

in

medical

technology.

Defendant has not used this certificate in many years and
has been employed only in a few minor jobs; during most of
defendant's marriage to plaintiff, she has been a full time
homemaker and not employed outside the home.
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basically good health, is intelligent, and is capable of
employment.

Defendant has no current source of income and

is entitled to an award of alimony.
9.

Defendant is entitled to alimony in the amount

of $1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and continuing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death
of plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant,
or upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever
event occurs first.
10.

Defendant is entitled to child support in the

amount of $622.00 per month, the same to be paid until the
child, Christopher, graduates from high school, assuming he
graduates on schedule with his class.
11.

Plaintiff is the owner of assets worth approxi-

mately $260,000.00 which are now in the entity known as the
Phillips Investments Trust.

These assets were gifted to

plaintiff by his parents over a period

of many years.

Neither plaintiff nor defendant have done any significant
work in the business which made up Phillips Investments, nor
have either of them made any contributions to the value of
the assets in Phillips Investments.

The assets of Phillips

Investments are plaintiff's separate property and defendant
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has no claim to this property.

The fact that plaintiff does

have the resources of Phillips Investments available to him
is relevant only to his ability to pay child support and
alimony.
12.

The parties have accumulated various assets in

the marriage, valued as follows:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
gh.
i.

J.
k.
1.

Equity in Riverdale, Utah home
Hoback, Wyoming property
Victor Estates
Plaintiff's retirement
Plaintiff and defendant IRAs
Weber Valley Bank savings
Moore Financial stock
Ketchum bank account
1986 Volkswagon automobile
1981 Honda automobile
Furniture and household contents in
defendant's possession
Furniture, sporting equipment and

$ 29,000,.00
45,000..00
4,500,.00
29,000,.00
14,528,.00
1,600,.00
648,.00
300,.00
6,800,.00
2,000,.00
6,500,.00
1,000,.00

personal effects in plaintiff1s poss.
13.

The

parties

have

incurred

various debts,

including a mortgage on the Riverdale home owing to Fleet
Mortgage in the approximate amount of $47,000.00, a bill
owing to Sears in the amount of $335.00, and $600.00 owing
to Rose Bourgeois for money loaned on the Hoback property.
14.

Plaintiff is employed by the United States

Forest Service and has health insurance coverage through his
employer.

Pursuant to the terms of the federal law known as

C.O.B.R.A., defendant is eligible to enroll for continued
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insurance coverage as the ex-spouse of a covered employee.
14.

Each party has retained an attorney to repre-

sent them in this action and has agreed to pay a reasonable
amount for attorney fees.
From the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the
court arrives at the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That both parties should be awarded a Decree of

Divorce from the other party herein, the same to become
final upon signing by the judge and filing with the clerk of
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of
Utah.
2.

That the sole care, custody and control of the

parties1 minor child, to-wit:

Christopher John Phillips be

awarded to defendant, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff.
3. That the plaintiff should pay to the defendant,
as and for child support, the sum of $622.00 per month, and
shall make such payments until said child attains majority
or the child's regular high school class graduates, whichever occurs later.
4.

That alimony should be awarded upon the follow-
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ing terms:

plaintiff should pay to defendant the sum of

$1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and continuing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death of
plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, or
upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever
event occurs first.
5.

One-half of plaintiff's monthly child support

and alimony payment, or $811.00, shall be paid directly to
defendant by the 1st day of each month and one-half shall be
paid directly to defendant by the 15th day of each month.
6.

That the child support Order should include, as

a means of collecting child support, a provision for withholding income pursuant to Sections 78-45d-l et seq., Utah
Code Annotated.
7.

Plaintiff and defendant shall alternate claim-

ing the minor child as a dependent on their tax returns with
plaintiff being entitled to claim him in 1987, defendant in
1988, and so on.

Plaintiff must be current on his child

support payments to claim the child as a dependent on his
tax return.

Defendant is required to sign the necessary

forms with the Internal Revenue Service which indicate that
plaintiff is entitled to claim the child as a deduction
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in the appropriate years.
8,
for

Plaintiff shall assist defendant in enrolling

continued

health

insurance

coverage

through

the

C.O.B.R.A. regulations and defendant shall be responsible
for paying the premiums for this coverage.
9.

Plaintiff should continue carrying medical and

dental insurance on the minor child, providing it remains
available through his place of employment.

Any medical or

dental bills of the child which are not covered by insurance
should be split between the parties, with each party having
the

responsibility

of paying

one-half

of any uncovered

medical or dental costs.
10.

That each party is awarded his or her own per-

sonal property already in their possession.
11.

Plaintiff should be awarded the following items

of property:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

His federal retirement, free of any
claim of the defendant
Furniture, sporting equipment and
personal effects in plaintiff!s poss.
1986 Volkswagon automobile
Ketchum bank account
Hoback property
Plaintiff's IRA
TOTAL
12.

$ 29,000.00
1,000.00
6,800.00
300.00
45,000.00
11,952.00
$ 94,052.00

Defendant is awarded the following items of

property:
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a.

Riverdale home located at
3985 South 700 West, subject to
mortgage thereon
b. Furniture and household contents
in defendant's possession
c. 1981 Honda automobile
d. Defendant's IRA
e. Weber Valley Bank savings
f. Moore Financial stock
g. Victor Estates

$ 29,000.00
6,500.00
2,000.00
2,57 6.00
1,600.00
648.00
4,500.00

TOTAL
13.

In

order

to

$ 46,824.00

equalize

the

above

property

distribution, plaintiff shall pay to defendant:
(a) the sum of $12,000.00 cash, the same to be
paid within ninety (90) days, or on or before January 21,
1988.
(b)

Pursuant

to

the

stipulation

of

the

parties, plaintiff shall pay to defendant an additional sum
of $12,000.00 in order to compensate her for plaintiff's
IRA.

This sum shall be paid within two (2) weeks of the

entry of this Decree of Divorce.
14.

The assets of Phillips Investments Trust are

plaintiff's sole and separate property and defendant has no
claim thereon.
15.

Defendant is entitled to all antiques which

were given to her by her family, free and clear of any claim
by plaintiff.
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16.

Defendant

shall

pay

the

mortgage

on

the

Riverdale home to Fleet Mortgage and hold plaintiff harmless
thereon, together with any other debts or obligations she
may have in her own name.
17.
approximate

Plaintiff shall pay the Sears bill in the
amount

of

$3 35.00, the debt

owing

to Rose

Bourgeois in the amount of $600.00, together with any other
debts or obligations he may have in his own name and hold
defendant harmless thereon.
18.

Plaintiff shall pay to defendant's attorney,

Robert L. Neeley, the sum of $1,000.00 as partial payment of
defendant's attorney fees.
20•

Let Judgment and Decree be entered in accor-

dance herewith.
DATED this

/if

day of

///^^f^

BY THE COURT:

IV-IETE". "ROTH
~
•-District Court Judge

?ERT L.
Attorney for Defendant

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

1987.
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JANE A. MARQUARDT
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-3662
Utah State Bar No. 2085
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DECREE OF DIVORCE

SCOTT H. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

KATHRYN A. PHILLIPS,

98183

Defendant.
The above entitled matter came on regularly for
trial on October 23, 1987 before the Honorable David E.
Roth, judge of the above entitled court.

Plaintiff was both

personally present and represented by his attorney Jane A.
Marquardt.

Defendant was present and represented by her

attorney Robert L. Neeley.

Upon hearing sworn testimony

from the parties and witnesses, after receiving into evidence

various

counsel, being

written

exhibits,

fully advised

hearing

arguments

of

in the matter, and having

already made and entered, separately and in writing, its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having therein
directed

entry

of

Judgment

and

Decree

in

accordance

Recorded Qrs
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therewith.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED as follows:
1.

That both parties are awarded

a Decree of

Divorce from the other party herein, the same to become
final upon signing by the judge and filing with the clerk of
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of
Utah.
2.

That the sole care, custody and control of the

parties1 minor child, to-wit: Christopher John Phillips, be
awarded to defendant, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff.
3.

That the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant,

as and for child support, the sum of $622.00 per month, and
shall make such payments until said child attains majority
or the child's regular high school class graduates, whichever occurs later.
4.
terms:

That alimony is awarded upon the following

plaintiff

shall

pay

to

defendant

the

sum

of

$1,000.00 per month, beginning November 1, 1987 and continuing for a period of ten (10) years, or until the death of
plaintiff or defendant, or the remarriage of defendant, or

Recorded BookL 4
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upon defendant's cohabitation with another man, whichever
event occurs first.
5.

One half of plaintiff's monthly child support

and alimony payment, or $811.00, shall be paid directly to
defendant by the 1st day of each month and one-half shall be
paid directly to defendant by the 15th day of each month.
6.

That the child support Order shall include, as

a means of collecting child support, a provision for withholding income pursuant to Sections 78-45d-l et seq., Utah
Code Annotated.
7.

Plaintiff and defendant shall alternate claim-

ing the minor child as a dependent on their tax returns with
plaintiff being entitled to claim him in 1987, defendant in
1988, and so on.

Plaintiff must be current on his child

support payments to claim the child as a dependent on his
tax return.

Defendant is required to sign the necessary

forms with the Internal Revenue Service which indicate that
plaintiff is entitled to claim the child as a deduction
in the appropriate years.
8.
for

Plaintiff shall assist defendant in enrolling

continued

health

insurance

coverage

through

the

C.O.B.R.A. regulations and defendant shall be responsible

Recorded Bockl 4
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for paying the premiums for this coverage.
9.

Plaintiff shall continue carrying medical and

dental insurance on the minor child, providing it remains
available through his place of employment.

Any medical or

dental bills of the child which are not covered by insurance
shall be split between the parties, with each party having
the responsibility of paying one-half of any uncovered medical or dental costs.
10.

That each party is awarded his or her own per-

sonal property already in their possession.
11.

Plaintiff is awarded the following items of

property:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

His federal retirement, free of any
claim of the defendant
Furniture, sporting equipment and
personal effects in plaintiff's poss.
1986 Volkswagon automobile
Ketchum bank account
Hoback property
Plaintiff's IRA
TOTAL
12.

$ 29,000.00
1,000.00
6,800.00
300.00
45,000.00
11,952.00
$ 94,052.00

Defendant is awarded the following items of

property:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Riverdale home located at
3985 South 700 West, subject to
mortgage thereon
Furniture and household contents
in defendant's possession
1981 Honda automobile
Defendant's IRA

$ 29,000.00
6,500.00
2,000.00
2,57 6.00

Recorded BcolJ 4 1
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....

e.
f.

Weber Valley Bank savings
Moore Financial stock

1,600.00
648.00

g.

Victor Estates

4,500.00
TOTAL

13.

In

order

to

$ 46,824.00

equalize

the

above

property

distribution, plaintiff shall pay to defendant:
(a)

the sum of $12,000.00 cash, the same to be

paid within ninety

(90) days, or on or before January 21,

1988.
(b)

an additional sum of $12,000.00 in order

to compensate her for plaintiff's IRA, the same to be paid
within two (2) weeks of the entry of this Decree of Divorce.
14.

The assets of Phillips Investments Trust are

plaintiff's sole and separate property and defendant has no
claim thereon.
15.

Defendant is entitled

to all antiques which

were given to her by her family, free and clear of any claim
by plaintiff.
16.

Defendant

shall

pay

the

mortgage

on

the

Riverdale home to Fleet Mortgage and hold plaintiff harmless
thereon, together with any other debts or obligations she
may have in her own name.
17.

Plaintiff

shall pay

the Sears

bill

in the
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of

$3 35.00, the debt

owing

to Rose

Bourgeois in the amount of $600.00, together with any other
debts or obligations he may have in his own name and hold
defendant harmless thereon.
18.

Plaintiff shall pay to defendants attorney,

Robert L. Neeley, the sum of $1,000.00 as partial payment of
defendant's attorney fees.
19.

That each of the parties shall execute and

deliver to the other party any deeds, stock certificates,
insurance policies, assignments, and any other documents or
instruments as may be necessary to release the claim of the
other in their respective real and personal properties as
now held in the possession of each of the parties.

Each

party has entered his or her appearance before this Court
and this Court hereby assumes continuing jurisdiction and
authority to enter such Orders as may be necessary or appropriate to accomplish the purposes of this paragraph
DATED this

/£

day of_
BY THE COURT:

E. ROTH
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

JBERT L. NEELEY
attorney f o r Defendant

, 1987.

JOINDER OF SPOUSE

KATHY A. PJIILLIPS, the wife of SCOTT H. PHILLIPS, hereby states and
acknowledges that the partnership interest in PHILLIPS INVESTMENTS owned by
her husband, Scott H. Phillips, was entirely derived from the receipt of
property

distributed

to

her

Iiusband

from

the

liquidation

of

Phillips

Investment to., the stock of which was acquired by her husband prior to their
marriage or by gift during

their mamap*? ann therefore, is his sole and

separate property i n which she claims no IHLCICSC, community or otherwise;
and it is further agreed that all income and gain from such separate property
shall be the sole and separate property of said husband.
KATHY A. PHILLIPS further states and acknowledges that she has read
the foregoing General Partnership Agreement and understands the provisions
thereof

and

in

consideration

of

the

execution of said Agreement by the

Partners, hereby agrees to be fully bound and controlled by the terms of said
Agreement; and, further, that upon the death of her husband she shall execute
any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and provisions of this
Agreement and/or to accomplish the transfer of all stock owned by her husband
to the surviving Partner, pursuant to the terms of said Agreement.

DATED: J|,is (2&

day o{

J^\

, 1983.

alhy A.
Kalhy
A. Phillips
Phillip

^

STATE OF UTAH
_unty of UXXgy

)

On this (ZjL
day of I ^M&U
lfe
before me, the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said fitate, personally appeared KATHY
PHILLIPS, known by me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument^ and acknowledged to me tha>^sTie el^cuted the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have h
official seal the day and year in this c/er

? hand and afixreC my
above written.

blic JL/I snd ioit
idmg at CxTctek

the St ate of
1/T

Exhibit E
At Tr. p.22, lines 8-12, Frances Phillips states
that she and her husband gifted money to her two sons (Scott
and Mark) each year.
And that money from the gift that we gave
to the boys was used to pay the premiums
on the—those life insurance policies•
At Tr. p. 32, lines 24 & 25 and p. 33, lines 1-12,
Frances Phillips testified that Phillips Investments had an
insurance account and that Scott had been able to use that
in order to acquire his brother Mark's interest.
Q. Now, Scott didn't have to give
up
anything
personally
because
fortunately there was this insurance
policy?
A.
That's why it had been set up
that way.
Tr. p.33, lines 10-12.
At Tr. p.40, lines 7-13, Mr. Hugh Phillips testified that he and his wife had given yearly gifts to their
sons so they could pay the insurance premiums.
Q. Were you also in addition to the
shares of stock, giving your sons cash in
order to pay premiums on life insurance
policies?
A.
Mrs. Phillips and I, from our
personal checking account, our personal
assets, we made a gift to our two sons
every year so they could pay for the premiums of life insurance on Mrs. Phillips,
on Mark and on Scott.
At Tr. p.46, lines 23-35 and p.47, lines 1-3, Mr.
Hugh Phillips verifies that Scott Phillips never put any of
his personal assets into Phillips Investments.
-1-

Q. Do you ever recall at any time,
either while it was Phillips Investment
Corporation or all the way up to now with
it being Phillips Investment Trust, Scott
Phillips taking any assets that he had
acquired through his employment and putting it into Phillips Investment?
A.

No, he did not.

No exception was made to that statement to state that Scott
somehow had used his own funds to purchase the insurance
premiums.
At Tr. p.69, lines 20-25, and p.70, lines 1-6,
Scott Phillips also testified that the insurance premiums
were paid

from monies that were gifted

brother by his parents.
he had

received

to him and his

Scott was discussing the fact that

$12,000.00 from the Phillips Investment

funds and had used it as a down payment on a family home
(that payment thus became part of the marital estate).
Scott explained that he had had to ask his brother Mark for
the money and that Mark was the one who determined whether
or not there was any such money to use.
A.
(Scott Phillips1 testimony)...
Mark said, Scott, there is some left over
money here from the gifting program from
our parents after the insurance premiums
were paid that would be available to you.
At Tr. p.140, lines 20-23, Mrs. Kathy Phillips also
verifies that she and her husband did not put any money into
Phillips Investments.
Q.
And you and Scott never took
your own property or things that you
bought from his Forest Service salary and
put it into Phillips Investment, did you?
-2-

A. NO.
Certainly there was no testimony from Kathy Phillips that
Scott had been paying insurance premiums out of their marital property.
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